The papers in are about this course.

As an , even Nietzsche's metaphysics is theology, although it seems far removed from scholastic metaphysics. The ontology of beings as such thinks as will to power. Such ontology thinks the of beings as such and as a whole theologically as the eternal recurrence of the same. Such metaphysical theology is of course a negative theology of a peculiar type. Its negativity is revealed in the expression "God is dead." That is an expression not of atheism but of ontotheology, in that metaphysics in which nihilism proper if fulfilled.

Basic Writings is on the page.

 Basic Concepts . Translated by Gary Aylesworth, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1993.

. Translated by and , Indiana University Press, 2010.

We said that ontology is the science of being. But being is always the being of a being. Being is essentially different from a being, from beings. How is the distinction between being and beings to be grasped? How can its possibility be explained? If being is not itself a being, how then does it nevertheless belong to beings, since, after all, being and only beings ? What does it mean to say that being to beings? The correct answer to this question is the basic presupposition needed to set about the problems of ontology regarded as the science of being. We must be able to bring out clearly the difference between being and beings in order to make something like being the theme of inquiry. This distinction is not arbitrary; rather, it is the one by which the theme of ontology and thus of philosophy itself is first of all attained. It is a distinction which is first and foremost constitutive for ontology. We call it the --the differentiation between being and beings. P. 17

Written in 1924, for the journal , but not published.

"This is how Schopenhauer's philosophy...should always be interpreted first of all: individually, by the single human being alone for himself, to gain some insight into his own misery and need, into his own limitation...He teaches us to distinguish between real and apparent promotions of human happiness: how neither riches, nor honors, nor scholarship can raise the individual out of his discouragement over the worthlessness of his existence, and how the striving for these goals can receive meaning only from a high and transfiguring over-all aim: to gain power to help nature and to correct a little its follies and blunders. To begin with, for oneself; but eventually through oneself for all.

The Concept of Time. Translated by William McNeill, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992.

The Heidegger Reader is on the page.

In "The Thing" Heidegger tells us that the elements of the fourfold (earth, sky, gods, mortals) cannot be understood by their separate essential natures. Gathered together the four are unconcealed and there . The unity of the fourfold, their mirroring of each other, is .

In the first lecture Heidegger refers to in poetry.

Reflection on what may be is completely and decidedly determined only in regard to the question of . Art is considered neither an area of cultural achievement nor an appearance of spirit; it belongs to the by way of which the "meaning of Being" (cf. ) can alone be defined.

A quarter of the first dialogue was published in 1959, in revised form in .

Here's what means, in "Overcoming Metaphysics".

This is a lecture course presented at the University of Marburg during summer semester 1927. Heidegger looks at the philosophical history of ontology, with an emphasis on Kant in the first half, and then examines time as temporality and its relation to being. The material covered was intended for, the never published, division 3 of part 1, and part 2 of .

In the introduction the translator relates the ontological difference to Appropriation/:

. Translated by Ted Sadler, London, Continuum, 2002.

The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics . Translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1995.

The Essence of Human Freedom . Translated by Ted Sadler, London, , 2002.

In 1969, at Le Thor, the seminar addressed and .

The naming calls. Calling brings closer what it calls. However this bringing closer does not fetch what is called only in order to set it down in closest proximity to what is present, to find a place for it there. The call does indeed call. Thus it brings the presence of what was previously uncalled into a nearness.