*Keloid scars on a woman’s back. (HPMM)

(The memorandum is also available at the above-cited Home Pageand e-mail address.) The overall goal is to attempt to move beyond increasinglysterile and time-consuming aspects of the current discussion--andto provide sufficient information to researchers, historyteachers, and graduate students and undergraduates so that theycan make informed judgments on the evidentiary questions forthemselves.

*Close-up of previous photo. (HPMM)

 *Figure 12. Cumulative death rate of atomic bomb victims. (, p. 86. Fig. 12)

*Days of development of keloids. (, 122. Table 20)

However, Feis'sjudgment on the central issue has for decades helped seriousscholars establish some of the lines of legitimate debate (and,implicitly, of informed and uninformed criticism as well).

*Clinical changes of keloids. , 122. Table 21)

645.] One may disagree with such judgments, of course, or with theconclusions of the Strategic Bombing Survey itself; and, in theend, Feis came to feel that the decision made by the men he wasso close to should nonetheless not be criticized.

—secondary injuries sustained from flying debris, burial under rubble, and blast compression

Samuel Walker,Chief Historian of the U.S.

In thesecircumstances, after July 26 and the publication of the PotsdamProclamation, the choice before the military leaders wasnarrowed--use the bomb or invade.

NEWS AND WORLD REPORT) published astrongly worded two-page editorial:

At the outset, however, a simple contention: It is time toget beyond easy dismissals of military views on the basis ofspeculation which favors critics but disregards the frequency,depth, and consistency of the statements--and, one might add, thehonor and integrity of the men involved as well.

(See, for instance, Uday Mohan, H-DIPLO, Oct.

Moreover, given that there is again no solid evidence--onlyspeculation--to the contrary, it is also not unreasonable toassume that such repeatedly stated views were close to what theyfelt at the time (or, minimally, not bald-faced lies in directcontradiction to what they had privately advised the President ofthe United States on so important a matter).

Immediate disorientation and coma occur with 10,000 rads, and death follows within hours.

On August 14, 1945, the Japanese surrendered.

Instead of asking whether the bombwas essential to compel "surrender on our terms within a fewmonths," he now clarified that he meant "before [Japan] wasinvaded." And instead of the formulation "There can hardly be,"he now wrote: "There CANNOT be a well-grounded dissent from theconclusion reached as early as 1945 by members of the U.S.

*Frequency of A-bomb cataracts in Hiroshima victims exposed in infancy. (, 208)

Indeed, many raised important andinsightful points.

358-65] virtually all theimportant high-level World War II military leaders who had accessto the relevant top secret information are on record as statingthat the use of the atomic bomb was not a matter of militarynecessity.

*Crude incidence of leukemia among A-bomb survivors and controls, in 1950-1971 sample. (, 130).

[Emphasis added; DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Vol.

9, 1996.] To more fully evaluate the position of the military--especially given the challenges presented by the incompleterecord--we must consider other alternatives being considered atthe level of the President, a subject we turn to in the nextPart.