*Close-up of previous photo. (HPMM)
*Days of development of keloids. (, 122. Table 20)
However, Feis'sjudgment on the central issue has for decades helped seriousscholars establish some of the lines of legitimate debate (and,implicitly, of informed and uninformed criticism as well).
*Clinical changes of keloids. , 122. Table 21)
645.] One may disagree with such judgments, of course, or with theconclusions of the Strategic Bombing Survey itself; and, in theend, Feis came to feel that the decision made by the men he wasso close to should nonetheless not be criticized.
Samuel Walker,Chief Historian of the U.S.
In thesecircumstances, after July 26 and the publication of the PotsdamProclamation, the choice before the military leaders wasnarrowed--use the bomb or invade.
NEWS AND WORLD REPORT) published astrongly worded two-page editorial:
At the outset, however, a simple contention: It is time toget beyond easy dismissals of military views on the basis ofspeculation which favors critics but disregards the frequency,depth, and consistency of the statements--and, one might add, thehonor and integrity of the men involved as well.
(See, for instance, Uday Mohan, H-DIPLO, Oct.
Moreover, given that there is again no solid evidence--onlyspeculation--to the contrary, it is also not unreasonable toassume that such repeatedly stated views were close to what theyfelt at the time (or, minimally, not bald-faced lies in directcontradiction to what they had privately advised the President ofthe United States on so important a matter).