by Patrick Maynard and Susan Feagin (Oxford, 1998);Anne D.
by Catriona MacKenzie and Natalie Stoljar (Oxford, 2000);John F.
But it is not successful; and with the qualifications, elaborations, and restatements of the fundamental version of the moral law we get the impression that Kant himself feels the inadequacy of the principle.
The term is used especially in reference to our lack of of .
With the moral law, however, we get a simple rule pulled directly out of the metaphysical hat, and no real consideration at all of the source of the concepts involved or the validity of derived propositions.
Verbis meis addere nihil audebant
This is especially acute when Kant's argument for securing one's happiness is that "discontent with one's condition under pressure from many cares and amid unsatisfied wants could easily become a great temptation to transgress duties." Developing a talent in an area for which one feels no attraction or affinity and which generates only "discontent" and even misery "could easily become a great temptation to transgress duties." This betrays a looming incoherence in Kant's thought, which is the result, as we shall see, of duty being the only truly rational goal of action.
et super illos stillebat eloquium meum.
I suspect that this is Kant's view, as part of a system of ethics in which, as Nelson says, "every action must be characterized as either fulfillment or violation of duty." But we also have the paradox, as I have noted , that Kant thinks that "To secure one's own happiness is at least indirectly a duty." So under Kantian ethics, we seem to have a duty to develop talents that may make us unhappy, while we also have a duty to secure our happiness.